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Next year it will be  the  1Oth anniversary of the de-
cision taken by the Heads of State and Government of 
the  Community  to  work  towards  an  economic  and 
monetary  union.  The  progress  which  has  been  made 
since  then  has  been  disappointing,  but the  objective 
remains intact. We are now making our second major 
effort to move towards it through the establishment of 
a zone  of monetary stability in  Europe to be  achieved 
through the creation of a European  Monetary System. 
If we  succeed  we shall  give our Community the most 
creative  impulse since the first achievements after the 
signature of the Treaty of Rome; if we fail we shall risk 
not just a minor setback but the frustration  of one of 
our fundamental purposes with all the political and eco-
nomic consequences that would entail. 
Before  looking  at  the  choices  which  now face  the 
member states of the Community, I want to say a word 
or two about how and  why we  arrived where we are. 
Just over a year ago,  I tried to set  out in  a speech  at 
Florence the reasons for re-examining the case for eco-
nomic and monetary union.  I wanted thus to take the 
issue out of the realm of academic debate and bring it 
back into that of live politics. 
Florence speech 
I do not need to rehearse the main arguments I then 
advanced but I will briefly mention them. I drew atten-
tion  to the need  for a  more  efficient and  rationalized 
development of industry and  commerce  in  Europe.  I 
spoke of the so far unexercised ability of the Europeans 
to create a currency of their own, based on a spread of 
wealth and power comparable with those of the United 
States: in doing so  I said that although I thought float-
ing exchange rates were here to stay,  they should be 
between continents rather than  between the countries 
of Western  Europe,  all  of which are  intermingled in  a 
thickly populated half continent, and nine of which are 
united  in  a  common  market and  pledged  to  political 
and economic integration. I said that control of a single 
European  currency by a single European monetary au-
thority could achieve a measure of anti-inflationary dis-
cipline  beyond  the  reach  of  most  individual  member states.  I argued that policies which would favour sta-
bility and  expansion,  strengthen  demand  on  a  broad 
geographical  basis,  and  avoid  exchange  rate  crises, 
would give a much needed new impulse on an  historic 
scale to the European economy with the effect of reduc-
ing unemployment and creating  new wealth through-
out the system.  I referred to the need for redistribution 
and transfer of resources within the system so that pub-
lic finance could be channelled to the poorer areas and 
the imbalances which continue to disfigure Community 
Europe could  be  counteracted.  I called  for decentrali-
zation in some fields to balance the centralization which 
would be  necessary in a limited number of others.  Fin-
ally  I  spoke  of  economic  and  monetary  union  as  a 
means  towards  political  integration  and  the  ultimate 
European  union  to  which  the  member  states  of the 
Community are committed. 
Speed of developments 
Since  then  things  have  moved  further  and  faster 
than I -or I think anyone else- thought possible. Per-
haps  I  should  single  out  two  main  reasons  for  this 
change of climate. The first is that people became bet-
ter aware that the differential  movement of European 
currencies against each other was making nonsense of 
the notion of a common market, and still more that of 
a  Community.  Those  countries  in  surplus,  mostly 
strongly export-oriented, found that decline in  demand 
from countries in deficit held back their ability to stimu-
late their economies; while those  in  deficit were frus-
trated  in  their  efforts  to  achieve  higher growth  by a 
succession  of exchange rate crises.  Hence,  in part, the 
relatively  poor  productivity  of  Europe,  the  relatively 
poor  rate  of  growth  and  the  relatively  high  rate  of 
unemployment,  all  of which stood  in  marked contrast 
with what had  been achieved  in  Europe  in  earlier de-
cades of relative monetary stability. The United States 
and Japan, subject to intercontinental but not to inter-
nal  monetary upheavals,  performed  better. 
Weakness of dollar 
The  second  major factor was the continuing weak-
ness of the US dollar and the increasing precariousness 
of the international monetary system of which the dol-
lar remains in practice, although not in theory (as under 
the  Bretton  Woods arrangement),  the  essential  pivot. 
To keep some sort of system going and discharge their 
responsibilities in  the common interest, the Europeans 
took in  more dollars than they could conceivably want 
or need. This in turn had drastic effects on the ability of 
European  governments  to  control  their  own  money 
supply.  In  circumstances  in  which  the  world  system 
was  manifestly failing,  the  Europeans  not unnaturally 
felt  that  they  should  try  to  achieve  some  stability 
among themselves both for its own sake and in order to 
make a contribution to a new and better balanced inter-
national system in the future. I shall have a word or two 
more to say about this point later on. 
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For  nine months now we  have  been  talking  about 
the  creation  of a  European  Monetary  System,  and  I 
hope - as  is  appropriate -that the  birth  is  about  to 
take  place.  Since  the  Copenhagen  meeting  of  the 
European  Council  in  April much work has  been  done, 
thanks in large measure to the impluse given by Chan-
cellor  Schmidt  and  President  Giscard  d'Estaing.  The 
measure of agreement reached at the European Council 
at  Bremen astonished the world and laid the basis  for 
the detailed and technical work which is under way. As 
you know, we then envisaged that the European Coun-
cil at Brussels next month should approve the creation 
of a European Monetary System to come into being on 
1  January  next  year.  The  creation  of such  a  system 
would not of course  be  the same as  a  European  eco-
nomic and  monetary  union,  but it would  be  a  major 
stride towards it. 
No back-sliding from  Bremen 
Success,  while far from  certain,  is  still  well  within 
our grasp. I want in the rest of my talk to consider some 
of the problems which have arisen and what might be 
done about them. First let me say as clearly and firmly 
as  I can  that there must be  no back-sliding from what 
was envisaged at Bremen. There is a particular respon-
sibility on those who then took the lead.  The detailed 
and  technical  work to which  I  have just referred  and 
which is of course essential if we are to achieve anyth-
ing  worthwhile,  must  not nevertheless  be  allowed  to 
obscure  or  diminish  the  fundamental  perspective  of 
Bremen.  Let  me  recall  what  these  were.  First  the 
European Council agreed that the creation of a zone of 
monetary stability in Europe was a highly desirable ob-
jective: the European Monetary System whose purpose 
was to  bring  it about must  be  durable and  effective. 
Secondly the European  Council agreed to work on the 
basis  of  a  specific  scheme  for  the  creation  of  a 
European  Monetary  System  although  it naturally  left 
this scheme open  to amendment if necessary.  Thirdly 
the European Council agreed that there should be con-
current  studies  of the  action  needed  to  be  taken  to 
strengthen the economies of the less prosperous mem-
ber  countries  in  the context of a  European  Monetary 
System,  and stated that such measures would be  ess-
ential if the zone of monetary stability was to succeed. 
The essentials of the scheme on which all agreed to 
work  can  be  stated  as  the  creation  of  an  ECU  (or 
European  Currency  Unit) at the  centre of the system 
and  as  a  means  of  settlement  between  Community 
monetary authorities; the depositing of reserves for use 
among  Community central  banks  (illustrative  but  im-
pact-making figures of 20 per cent of the gold and dol-
lar reserves of Member States and 20 per cent of their 
national  currencies  were  cited);  the  co-ordination  of 
exchange  rate  policies with  regard  to third  countries; 
and  the  eventual  creation  of  a  European  Monetary 
Fund.  I  recall  these  points  because  they are  in  some 
danger of being  buried  beneath  the  leaves  of an  au-
tumn of detailed discussion.  But the decisions at  Bre-men  and  the  essentials  of the  scheme  on  which  all 
agreed to work· are the indispensable basis of what we 
intend to set in  place next year. 
Parity-grid versus  basket of currencies 
Some of the arguments which have taken  place  in 
and  out  of the  Community  institutions  and  between 
governments  necessarily  have  a  highly  technical 
character. At the same time most cover points of under-
lying  importance.  First  there  has  been  the discussion 
about  the  choice  of  numeraire  for  the  new  system. 
Should exchange rates  be defined in  terms of a parity 
grid,  as  in  the present snake?  Or should they be  de-
fined  in terms of a basket of currencies,  the basket in 
this  case  being  the  European  Currency  Unit  whose 
composition would be the same as  that of the present 
European  unti  of account? These  are  stong technical 
arguments for using the grid as the method of interven-
tion,  but there  has  also  been  an  underlying  division 
between  those  countries at present  in  the snake who 
fear that the introduction of a basket system would im-
pose· unwanted  responsibilities  on  them  and  promote 
inflation; and those at present outside who fear that the 
introduction of the parity grid would tilt the system  in 
favour of creditor countries and  impose an  unwanted 
degree of deflation.  I will  not enter into the details of 
the argument, which I have no doubt are well known to 
you, but will simply draw attention to the so-called Bel-
gian compromise which would define intervention obli-
gations in terms of a parity grid, but use the basket as 
an  indicator of divergence,  that is  to say  would show 
whether creditor or debtor countries were getting out of 
line, and thus impose a certain symmetry of obligation. 
This argument is not resolved; but I have no doubt that 
it can  and should be  in  the near future. 
Importance of adjustment 
Second there has been discussion about the width of 
margins to each  side of the numeraire,  and  the poss-
bility of adjustment.  Here again there is  some conflict 
of interest between those who are happy to retain  the 
present  margins  of the  snake  and  those  (one  at  any 
rate) who would prefer wider margins. This is an  argu-
ment over percentages into which I shall not enter. The 
question of adjustment is  more important. Any partici-
pant in  the system  must be  able to change its central 
rate  if its costs and prices move out of line with those 
of  its  competitors  or if it has  undergone a  structural 
change in  its balance of payments. This is already true 
of the existing snake arrangements. It would obviously 
be contrary to the spirit of the whole enterprise if cer-
tain  countries,  in  particular those  with  relatively  high 
rates of inflation, availed themselves too often and too 
easily  of the  possibility of change  and  made no sus-
tained  effort to bring their inflation  rates  down to the 
level  of  their  partners.  Nevertheless  some  flexibility 
must be  built into the system,  and  some of the fears 
which have been expressed  about its absence seem to 
be  ill-founded. 
Reserves  and  drawing-rights 
Next there has been substantial discussion about the 
extent of the reserves on which members of the system 
can  draw,  and the conditions on which they could do 
so.  The Commission's position is clear: we support the. 
arrangements set out in  the scheme discussed at Bre-
men. There are a number of legal and even- in some 
countries - constitutional obstacles to be overcome but 
in  order to ensure  that when  the new system  comes 
into operation there will be sufficient financing to back 
it up we must at least agree substantially to strengthen 
the existing network of credit facilities. Here I think two 
improvements could be introduced: first the duration of 
the very short-term financing -the unlimited bilateral 
support that central  banks  can  draw upon  to  finance 
their intervention operations- could be extended; and 
secondly  the  present  network of  short  and  medium-
term  credits  should  be  increased  in  amount,  from 
around  1  0  million  European  Units of Account at  the 
moment to around 25 million. Obviously the larger the 
credit  facilities,  the  less  they  are  likely  to  be  called 
upon. The more you have the less you need.  There  is 
no economy more self-defeating and short-sighted than 
to fail to provide adequate measures. 
Convergent economic policies 
The issues  underlying the so-called technical  points 
are  obviously of great  importance.  But they must be 
seen  in  the wider context of our continuing  and  now 
more determined efforts to bring about greater conver-
gence in the economic policies of the member states of 
the Community. Any arrangement for the future which 
was exclusively monetary would be  bound to fail. The 
economies  of the  Community are  now moving  along 
more parallel paths than was the case a few years ago. 
Their trade  with  each  other is  immense.  But the  dif-
ferences  between  them  are  still  substantial.  Inflation 
rates vary considerably.  Resources are  not evenly dis-
tributed. Growth rates are different. Budgetary and fis-
cal  policies are different as well, with each government 
naturally doing what it finds best for its country's par-
ticular circumstances and with only some regard for the 
interests of the Community as  a whole.  Clearly  if the 
new European Monetary System is to be,  in the words 
of Bremen, durable and effective,  it must take account 
of the economic as  well as  monetary circumstances of 
each  member state and be  matched  by a still greater 
effort of co-ordination on  the part of member govern-
ments  than  any  have  been  willing  to  attempt  in  the 
past.  The  Commission  has  made a series of proposals 
for such  co-ordination,  and  has  emphasised - as  I do 
again  today -the need  for  such  co-ordination  to  be 
seen  in  the  framework of an  eventual  economic and 
monetary union. 
Strengthening the weaker members 
This general point was fully emphasised at Bremen. 
The  specific argument which  has  since  arisen  is  over 
the phrase then accepted which said that there would 
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strengthen the economies of the less prosperous mem-
ber  countries",  all  put  clearly  in  the  context  of  the 
European Monetary System. This is obviously of crucial 
importance to those countries which  are  less  prosper-
ous,  and  I  betray no secret  if I  place  in  this category 
Ireland,  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom.  What  action 
should be taken to strengthen the economies of these 
countries  is  still  under  lively  discussion.  Some  have 
talked of the need to produce a more rational transfer 
of resources  inside the Community than arises  out of 
such existing Community mechanisms as the Commun-
ity budget and the Common Agricultural Policy. Others 
have spoken  of the need  for extension  and  reinforce-
ment of such  Community instruments as  the Regional 
Fund  and  the Social  Fund.  Yet  others have spoken of 
special  loans  at  favourable  rates  of  interest  arranged 
through  the  European  Investment  Bank  or  other 
mechanisms.  None of these  questions is  settled.  The 
debate  about  them  has  opened  up  some  pretty  fun-
damental questions about the functioning of the Com-
munity and the equity of its present mechanisms. This 
is  all  to  the  good.  But  I  think  we  all  recognise  that 
problems of this magnitude cannot be fully settled with 
a speed sufficient to meet the stringent time-table - de-
sirably  stringent- for  the  setting  up  of  a  European 
Monetary System.  But settled they must be if we are to 
have  a  Community  which  genuinely  represents  the 
common interests of member states. 
Interests differ within Community 
Before  concluding  I  want  to  underline  one  fun-
damental point. The interests of our member states are 
not  in  all  cases  the  same.  There  is,  for example,  an 
obvious  temptation  for  the  existing  members  of the 
snake  to  conceive  of  a  European  Monetary  System 
which would in many of its essential  be  no more than 
the  present  snake  writ  large.  There  is  another temp-
tation to which my own country of Britain is subject: to 
see the system as yet another continental entanglement 
conceived in the interests of countries whose economic 
performance  and  problems  are  different  from  their 
own.  My answer to those who would like the system 
simply to be a super snake  is  that it would simply be 
unworkable if it included, as  it should,  all or nearly all 
members of the Community. My answer to those who 
see it as a new entanglement in the interest of others is 
first  that  they  should  be  less  defensively  suspicious 
(such  suspicion has not served them well in the past); 
and  second that if it should  prove an  entanglement it 
would mean that the system did not properly reflect the 
common  interest  and  was  for whatever  reason  badly 
designed. I appeal to all members of the Community to 
play a full and responsible part in the creation of a new 
institution in  the interest of all. 
Dangers of two-speed  Europe 
I now give a warning. If it turns out that all members 
of the Community do not feel able to join, at least at the 
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beginning,  and  we  are  obliged  to  work  out ways  of 
squaring some very uncomfortable circles,  then I fore-
see the real  danger of the evolution of a two-speed Eu-
rope,  or perhaps  even  of a three-speed  Europe  when 
the Community is enlarged.  In such circumstances the 
very  sense  of  a  Community  would  be  imperilled.  A 
European  Monetary System  must be to the benefit of 
all  and  take  account of the  circumstances  of all.  Re-
sponsibility for failure would not necessarily  rest  only 
with those who felt  unable to join.  It would rest  also 
with those who insisted over-much on setting things in 
a mould which fitted some well, some not so well, and 
others not at all. 
EMS not directed against anyone 
I conclude with a word on  the international system 
of which the European  Monetary System would be  no 
more  than  a  part.  I  repeat  now what  has  been  said 
many times before: that the European  Monetary Sys-
tem is  in no way directed against the international sys-
tem nor against the US dollar. The health of the dollar 
is  essential  to the  health  of the  international  system, 
and  we greatly welcome the measures  recently taken 
by  President  Carter  to  strengthen  the  dollar.  At  the 
same  time  we  must  face  the  fact  that  the  Bretton 
Woods system as we knew it after the war has broken 
down, and that we must gradually seek some new ar-
rangements  to  take  its  place.  No-one  has  suggested 
that the European Currency Unit should take the place 
of the dollar for which a leading role in the international 
monetary system remains necessary and unquestioned. 
But it is possible to envisage a system in which respon-
sibility is  more  widely shared  and  in  which  both  the 
European  Currency  Unit and  of course  the Japanese 
yen  play a more important part. This is to  look further 
ahead  than  is  perhaps now easy  to do.  Today I want 
simply to emphasise that we live in one interdependent 
world and that what we plan for Europe must from the 
beginning be seen  as  something which does not con-
flict  with  but  assists  the  interests  of the  world  as  a 
whole. 
Editorial  note 
The main characteristics of the European 
Monetary System, proposed by France and 
the Federal Republic of Germany at the Bre-
men European Council, were outlined in an 
article which appeared in the Newsletter, No 
77, of 12 July 1978. 
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